Although the verification
machinery required to monitor the CTBT is eighty percent installed, as
mentioned, 163 countries in the world have ratified the treaty, still proving to be
problematic.
The United States has five
primary, twelve auxiliary, eig
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| CTBTO Office at Vienna Intentional Center |
ht infrasound, two hydroacoustic and eleven
radionuclide stations. All of them are certified except for three of the
infrasound stations, which are in the planning stage.
United States still needed to
ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, such as North Korea and Iran, will
ratify the treaty even if the United States ratifies. U.S. ratification is a
critically needed circuit-breaker: it would have an immediate impact on other
holdout states, and add major new momentum to both disarmament and
non-proliferation efforts. This may seem overly optimistic; however, international
norms impose a powerful influence on states. International instruments and
pressures have helped prevent a number of countries from acquiring nuclear
weapons. Regarding the other holdouts referenced above, Indonesia had stated
that it would ratify as soon as the United States becomes a state party;
however, it announced at the May 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty that it would proceed to ratify on its own. Indonesia
signed the treaty the day it was opened for signature, and its six auxiliary seismic
stations in the IMS are all certified.
It is widely believed that China will
ratify the treaty soon after the United States. Like the other P5 countries,
China signed the treaty the day it opened for signature, and the treaty has
been awaiting ratification in the National People's Congress for thirteen
years. China was active in the
negotiations in the CD and has participated in the work of the CTBT PrepCom,
including on OSI. A high level Chinese diplomat in Vienna said, China fully
cherishes the international norm that any nuclear test after the CTBT is a
violation, including for those countries outside of the CTBT.
In 1954 Indian
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru became the first to call for a nuclear test
ban. India has supported the elimination of nuclear weapons for many years and
participated dynamically in the negotiations in Geneva, serving as Friend of the
Chair on verification and legal issues. However, the treaty did not include
India's call for a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament and did include
India on the list of countries required to ratify for entry into force. India
responded by withdrawing its four monitoring stations from the IMS and declaring
that it would not approve the treaty in the CD.
In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted a series
of nuclear tests. India has since observed a moratorium on testing, and this is
considered a condition of the United States for cooperation on the civil nuclear
agreement of 2006. In 1999 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told the United
Nations General Assembly that India would "not stand in the way" of the
treaty coming into force.
Nevertheless, others are not so optimistic, in view
of a strong public opinion attached to the nuclear capability. Pakistan was
also active in the negotiations and has attended a number of meetings of the
PrepCom and three of the bi-annual Conferences on Facilitating Entry into Force
of the Treaty (Article XIV Conferences) as observer. Pakistan has supported the
conclusion of a test-ban treaty for many years, and voted for the treaty at the
United Nations in 1996, unlike India. It has also observed a moratorium on
nuclear testing since its tests in 1998. It was thought that Pakistan would
sign the treaty in tandem with India; however, Pakistan has recently claimed
that the US-India nuclear deal has affected the imbalance in their capabilities
and that it will act according to its own security interests. Israel also participated
actively in the negotiations in the CD.
As an observer it was not permitted to
break consensus; however, it contributed papers and proposed language that were
reflected in the treaty. It was especially interested in the provisions for
on-site inspections, being concerned about the non-abusive nature of the OSI
regime, equal status in the Executive Council and adherence to the treaty by
other Middle Eastern states. As the Executive Council is composed of regional
blocs, Israel is concerned that it will never be given a seat in the group encompassing
the Middle East and South Asia. Although many do not think that this will
prevent Israel from ratifying, Israel is unlikely to let its rights be
compromised.
Israel continues to participate in the deliberations in the
PrepCom, in particular on the OSI operational manual, training, and exercises. Iran
served in the negotiations as Friend of the Chair on aspects of verification
and on-site inspections. It signed the treaty on the day it opened for
signature, voted in favor of the CTBT resolution in 2009 and has engaged in the
meetings of the PrepCom, in particular in the Working Group on Verification.
Iran contends that its activities are related to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and has insinuated that it will link ratification to the CTBT with the
establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The argument
has been made that if Iran is serious about its claim that it is not developing
nuclear weapons, it would ratify the CTBT. It is one of the 118 members of the
Non-Aligned Movement, which has voiced its support of the CTBT on a number of
occasions. It holds the view that it has been in good standing with the NPT,
and until Israel ratifies the NPT to address what Egypt sees as an imbalance in
regional nonproliferation and disarmament, it will not support further arms
control agreements, including the CTBT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
Pelindaba Treaty, or the IAEA Additional Protocol.
One of the priorities for
Egypt is the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction.
North Korea is very difficult to assess, due to its closed
and secluded situation in the international arena. It participated in the
negotiations and voted for the UN resolution that adopted the treaty. It
conducted two nuclear weapon explosions, in 2006 and 2009, and has not
indicated plans in regard to the CTBT.
